A year of Turkish policy in post-Assad Syria

Last Updated on December 12, 2025 8:24 pm

By Dr. Sinem Cengiz

A year ago, when the Assad regime collapsed, many immediately declared that “Turkiye is the greatest winner in Syria,” given Ankara’s close ties with the new leadership in Damascus. Even US President Donald Trump implied the same thing.

However, over the past year, Turkiye has demonstrated that it is not after a dominant role in Syria, but rather a balanced partnership with the Ahmad Al-Sharaa leadership that could boost its legitimacy both at home and abroad. In the end, Ankara finally found a friend in Damascus whose success is strategically important for Turkiye.

Since Al-Sharaa assumed power, Turkiye has been sending the right signals, both regionally and internationally. Ankara’s rhetoric and actions demonstrate a clear consistency. In relations with both regional and international stakeholders, it has carefully avoided creating the perception of a zero-sum game in Syria, while trying to serve as a bridge between the new Syrian leadership and other actors. Turkiye’s approach has also provided the new leadership with enough political room to engage constructively with other actors.

Turkiye’s direct engagement with Syria following Bashar Assad’s fall was not surprising. It was the natural outcome of a process built on deep human, political, military and intelligence ties. Ankara sees that Assad’s fall did not solve all of Syria’s problems, but the country will no longer face the same challenges it once did. So, the new era has brought its own difficulties, yet it has also created space for renewed hope. Today, Syria presents Ankara with an opportunity to shape a more favorable regional order — one that is aligned with Turkiye’s long-term interests.

There are several roles that Turkiye can assume in helping the new Syria mitigate the challenges of this era. One is building a regional consensus mechanism. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has said that Middle Eastern states have adopted a principle of “regional ownership” in dealing with the issues that affect them. Regional ownership is a new phenomenon for our region, in which a zero-sum approach to regional dominance has previously been the primary guidance for states.

Regional ownership works through strengthened dialogue in the fields of security and economic cooperation. Today, from Saudi Arabia to Turkiye and from Egypt to Syria, all states want to benefit from regional connectivity projects in a bid to boost their economic standing. These states also know that without an anchor point in their own habitat, they cannot sail safely in a region of disorder. Idealist politics no longer shape their regional policies; it is pure realpolitik and pragmatism that prevails. But that also comes with a certain degree of competition.

In post-Assad Syria, Turkiye has been pursuing a three-pronged approach. First, under the bilateral agreement it signed with Damascus, it has started training the Syrian armed forces. The operational mechanisms Turkiye has established for Syria’s security are: bilateral cooperation between Damascus and Ankara; a regional cooperation committee composed of Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Turkiye; and the US-Turkiye Syria Working Group.

Second, Ankara has announced a program to support Syria’s “human and institutional capabilities,” to complement its military approach with developmental and governance support. This is because there is still a lack of trust in institutions in Syria and existing polarization.

Third, Ankara has engaged in Syria’s reconstruction projects. Turkish companies and public institutions have moved quickly to capture postwar opportunities, securing more than $11 billion in power and aviation contracts so far. So, unlike during the Assad era, it is not only the ministries of foreign affairs and defense working on Syria — all governmental and nongovernmental institutions have been directly engaging in issues in Syria within their own areas of responsibility and capacity.

Fidan stated that rebuilding Syria will require major international support, as current estimates show that restoring infrastructure and returning life to normal will cost about $216 billion. To revive the collapsed economy and attract investors, a stable environment is a must. However, the elephant in the room is the independent armed forces, such as the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. For Turkiye, the SDF has been and will continue to be the major issue in Syria until it is solved permanently.

In the post-Assad era, Turkiye’s top priority is to integrate all armed forces into a single, unified Syrian army. Fidan emphasized that the SDF must understand that “no country in the world maintains two separate armed forces,” warning that any dual military structure is unacceptable. The SDF is now running out of time, as the integration agreement it signed with Damascus in March is set to expire at the end of this month.

American policies are a significant factor in shaping Turkiye’s approach in Syria. So far, Ankara has been pleased that the Trump administration has provided an opportunity for engagement with the Syrian government in this new era. Turkiye views Washington’s stance as largely constructive. However, disagreements remain, particularly regarding the US’ unconditional and consistent support for Israel, whose increasing attacks in Syria continue to pose significant obstacles to both its security and economic improvement.

Turkiye has already extended its military mandate in Syria for the next three years — a mandate that is normally reviewed annually but has now been extended to this length for the first time. This reflects that Turkiye’s security concerns in Syria have not disappeared with the fall of Assad; on the contrary, they exist and Ankara’s military options remain open.

As the Turkish political elite acknowledges, Turkiye has paid a high price for instability in Iraq and Syria over recent decades. Moreover, it has learned bitter lessons during this period. These lessons are going to guide Turkiye’s Syria policy, which has been constructive and strategically patient over the past year.

Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz