All Along a Bumpy Road: Understanding Sinophobic Sentiments in Central Asia
Last Updated on May 27, 2025 10:29 pm
By Catherine Putz
In 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced the land-based portion of what we now call the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in a speech delivered in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana. More than a decade – and more than a trillion dollars in FDI across Asia, Africa and Latin America – later, China is Central Asia’s largest external economic partner. But Beijing is increasingly viewed with skepticism by regional publics, even as China remains a major political partner and increasing security provider to Central Asia’s governments.
In a recently published paper, “Bumps Along the Belt and Road: Unpacking Sinophobic Sentiments in Central Asia,” authors Bradley Jardine (The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs), Akbota Karibayeva (Department of Political Science, George Washington University), and Edward Lemon (Department of International Affairs, Texas A&M University, Washington, D.C.) examine “the patterns of pushback against China in Central Asia.” In exploring Chinese engagement in the region, they seek to detail what factors feed rising Sinophobic sentiments, paying close attention to what triggers protests, what drives citizens into the streets even in an autocratic region like Central Asia.
In the following interview, the authors outline the divide between elite and average opinions regarding China, what themes emerged from their research into China-related protests, and how regional governments have handled this upswing in Siniphobic sentiment.
How would you characterize contemporary sentiments regarding China in Central Asia?
Sentiments toward China are mixed, as we document in our forthcoming book “Backlash,” which draws on the protest data presented in our recent article in Europe Asia-Studies. Despite its geographic proximity, China remains culturally distant from Central Asia. Many do not know much about the country or people of China. But our protest data and opinion polls do indicate that Sinophobia is relatively widespread. Our protest data indicates that over two-thirds of protests in the region between 2018 and 2021 which targeted foreign governments or investors targeted China. Opinion poll data from the Central Asia Barometer indicates anti-Chinese sentiments peaked in about 2020 and have made marginal improvements since then (with the exception of Uzbekistan where opinions have grown more negative).
Do sentiments regarding China differ between the political/business elites and average citizens? What motivates this divergence?
Yes, there is a stark divergence between elite and public perceptions of China in Central Asia. This is captured by the Chinese saying “warm politics, cold publics.” Political and business elites largely view China as an essential development partner – highlighting its attractive financing of major infrastructure projects and its central role in regional trade, which grew from $3 billion in 2003 to $95 billion in 2022. This top-down orientation is visible in state-led efforts to promote Chinese-backed projects as part of national development strategies. China is also a useful partner for the region’s autocratic regimes as they seek to stay in power, transferring surveillance technologies, military hardware and defending them internationally.
In contrast, average citizens are more skeptical and often distrustful of China’s growing presence. Local communities frequently cite environmental damage, poor labor practices, and a lack of transparency as their primary concerns. These material grievances are reinforced by symbolic fears – of land loss, demographic encroachment, and cultural subordination.
This divide is deepened by the opaque nature of Chinese project negotiations, which typically bypass public input and foster the perception that elites are prioritizing foreign capital over national interests. Widespread perceptions of government corruption and complicity further fuel the belief that authorities have “sold out” to China. In the absence of transparent communication, conspiracy theories take root – such as the belief that Chinese-built roads are meant for future military use or that Chinese firms plan to dump toxic waste or test nuclear weapons on Kazakh land. While often exaggerated and detached from reality, these narratives reflect a deeper, persistent distrust rooted in unequal power dynamics and elite unresponsiveness.
In addition to interviews, you drew on a dataset of 192 China-related protests across the region over a period stretching from 2002 to 2023 in your research. What were some of the major themes or drivers of those protests?
Our dataset of 192 China-related protests across Central Asia from 2002 to 2023 reveals three major categories of mobilization: project-specific protests, general anti-China protests, and human rights-related protests, with the majority concentrated in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where civic space is relatively more open.
Project-specific protests were often driven by environmental and labor grievances. In Kyrgyzstan, most extractive industry-related protests were triggered by environmental damage. In Kazakhstan, by contrast, project-related protests focused primarily on labor conditions – low wages, unequal treatment, and the exclusion of local workers from senior roles in Chinese oil and construction firms.
General protests reflected broader anxieties about economic dependency and loss of national sovereignty. In Kazakhstan, land-related protests were driven by fears of Chinese territorial encroachment. These mobilizations were fueled by widespread suspicions that Chinese land leases would lead to permanent settlement or neocolonial exploitation. Relatedly, migration-related anxieties, rooted in fears of cultural erosion, were also prominent, even though the actual number of Chinese workers – and Chinese-Central Asian marriages – in the region remains relatively small.
Finally, a significant number of protests were driven by human rights concerns surrounding the mass detention of Uyghurs and co-ethnics in Xinjiang. These protests were often organized by civil society groups and family members of detainees and represented one of the most sustained forms of grassroots mobilization in the region.
Did you note any change over time, in terms of themes or intensity of Sinophobic sentiments? If so, what factors do you believe have contributed to this shift?
Yes, our data show both a quantitative increase and a qualitative shift in Sinophobic sentiments over time. The number of China-related protests in Central Asia rose notably after the 2016 land protests in Kazakhstan. Thematically, we observed a broadening of concerns – from localized, project-specific grievances against Chinese employers to more general and macro-level anxieties over growing Chinese dominance. This shift could be driven by several converging factors. First, China’s growing economic footprint made its presence more visible – and therefore more contested – in everyday life. Second, the lack of transparency surrounding many Chinese-backed projects, combined with perceptions of elite collusion, fed public suspicion and resentment. In the absence of credible communication from officials and business leaders, speculations and conspiracy theories reinforced the idea that China posed a threat to national survival. Third, rising nationalism and proliferation of digital platforms gave new momentum to grassroots mobilization, helping local actors frame their concerns in broader political and symbolic terms.
But as we noted above, opinion poll data points to sentiments toward China in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (traditionally the most anti-China countries) improving in the past three years. It is difficult to say why. But contributing factors may include rising negative sentiments toward Russia as it has waged its war of aggression against Ukraine, coupled with China’s efforts to improve its image with higher-value investments, employing more locals and seeking to shape its image in the local media.
How have regional governments responded to these protests and the apparent existence of Sinophobic sentiment among the public?
Responses by governments have varied. Mostly they have simply ignored the protesters. But in other cases they have tried to mute criticism of China and stop researchers from working on this theme. Tajik journalist Ruhshona Khakimova was sentenced to 8 years in prison for treason earlier this year, in part because she conducted a survey on attitudes toward China.
Our previous research using the Central Asia Protest Tracker (CAPT) found that protests against China are more likely to result in violence or arrests than other types of grievances. When protests have been more acute or widespread, such as the mass protests in Kazakhstan in 2016 in response to changes in the Land Code which would have allowed foreigners (i.e. Chinese) to lease land, the government has made concessions. In that case, the proposed changes were scrapped. In another case, in 2020 Kyrgyzstan’s government cancelled a $280 million proposed logistics hub at At-Bashi near the Chinese border after numerous local protests.
How does China compare with other external economic partners, such as Russia, Turkiye, the United States, or the EU, in terms of involvement, investment, and public sentiments?
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Turkiye has replaced Russia as the most popular external power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In surveys conducted at the end of 2022, 76 percent of respondents in Kazakhstan and 84 percent in Kyrgyzstan had positive attitudes toward Turkiye, whereas Russia remained slightly more popular in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan according to the same Central Asia Barometer survey. Russia’s popularity has waned since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, although it remains more popular than China according to Central Asia Barometer data. Opinions of the U.S. have been consistently mixed, averaging 40 percent unfavorable views in Kazakhstan, 35 percent in Kyrgyzstan and 30 percent in Uzbekistan, although views deteriorated after Israel’s invasion of Gaza, peaking at over 50 percent unfavorable in Uzbekistan by fall 2023.
It’s also clear that while protests against other projects such as Canadian mines, or Russian businesses, occur, Chinese projects overwhelmingly receive the vast majority of hostility.